Abstract-The objective of an Automated Highway System (AHS) is to increase the safety and throughput of the existing highway infrastructure by introducing traffic automation. AHS is an example of a large scale, multiagent complex dynamical system and is ideally suited for a hierarchical hybrid controller. We discuss the design of safe and efficient hybrid controllers for regulation of vehicles on an AHS. We use game theoretic techniques to deal with the multiagent and multiobjective nature of the problem. The result is a hybrid controller that by design guarantees safety, without the need for further verification. The calculations also provide an upper bound on the performance that can be expected in terms of throughput at various levels of centralization.
I. INTRODUCTION

H
YBRID systems, i.e., systems involving the interaction of discrete and continuous dynamics, pose challenging problems which have attracted the attention of researchers from a number of diverse fields. Considerable research effort has been devoted to fundamental topics such as modeling [1] - [6] and simulation [7] - [9] of hybrid systems. The modeling effort has produced formalisms that allow one to synthesize controllers and verify properties of the closed-loop system performance. For controller synthesis the tools that have been proposed extend techniques from discrete-event control [10] - [13] and optimal control [5] , [14] , [15] . For verification, on the other hand, some progress was made in extending conventional analysis tools such as Lyapunov methods for stability analysis [5] , [16] ; however, most research has concentrated on extending discrete methodologies, in particular model checking [1] , [2] , [17] , [18] and deductive [6] , [19] techniques. For model checking, the emphasis has been on systems and properties that can be algorithmically verified. A number of computer-aided tools have been developed for systems where the model checking approach is applicable [20] , [21] . For deductive reasoning, the emphasis has been on developing models that provide formal semantics for composition and abstraction and support proofs based on induction on the length of the system executions, invariant assertions, and simulation relations. Semi-automated tools (using, for example, automatic theorem provers) have been implemented to support this approach [22] .
Much of the research on hybrid systems has been motivated by applications such as automotive electronics, realtime software, communication protocols, and transportation. One application that has attracted considerable attention is Automated Highway Systems (AHS). The goal is to improve the throughput of the highway system while maintaining (at least) the same level of safety and passenger comfort as the current system. This is to be achieved by automating traffic without building new highways. Clearly, an AHS poses a very complex control problem. Part of the complication comes from its distributed nature. The system consists of a large number of agents (the vehicles) equipped with sensing, communication, and control capabilities that are trying to make efficient use of a common, scarce resource (the highway). Difficulties also arise from the multiple control requirements. The controller has to strive to satisfy many specifications, some of them conflicting. For example, the requirement for increased throughput implies that the vehicles should be traveling fast and close to one another, while the requirement for safety implies that they should be traveling slowly and with large spacings.
In [15] we introduced a methodology for dealing with such multiagent, multiobjective problems. Our method assumes that the requirements are prioritized; in the AHS case safety should be more important than throughput, for example. Then, assumptions are made about the flow of information between the agents. Typically the system is initially assumed to be fully decentralized, i.e., each agent has only access to local information, available through its sensors. The controller design is then seen as a game between the controller of each agent and the disturbance generated by the environment, which includes the actions of other agents. The design process establishes the limits of performance that can be achieved in "safety"; the lower priority requirements are then optimized within those limits. The resulting emergent behavior of the system (in the AHS case the throughput) is then extracted. If the level of performance is unsatisfactory, some centralization needs to be introduced. This is achieved by communication of information between the agents. Our calculations suggest what the most important pieces of information are. The effect of this more global knowledge is to reduce the set of possible disturbances generated by other agents. The process can be repeated: the new "biased" game is solved to determine the limits of safety, the low priority requirements are optimized within those limits, and the new emergent behavior is extracted.
In this paper we apply this methodology to the AHS problem. We first consider a decentralized design involving completely autonomous vehicles and then see how performance 0018-9286/98$10.00 © 1998 IEEE can be improved by allowing semi-autonomous vehicles that can form platoons. In either case our game theoretic approach is used to design controllers that are guaranteed to satisfy the safety requirements. The calculations also provide upper bounds on the throughput that can be expected in each case. Here we mainly address the problem of maintaining safety in this multiagent setting. The multiobjective nature of the system is also briefly discussed, but for more details the reader is referred to [23] . For application of similar techniques to Air Traffic Management Systems see [24] .
The question of safety is one of the most important issues for AHS and has therefore attracted considerable attention. In the context of platooning, the issue of controller design and safety for platoon followers has been addressed extensively in [25] . For autonomous vehicles and platoon leaders a number of controllers have been proposed [26] - [28] , some without explicit safety guarantees. Reference [29] highlighted problems, due primarily to the hybrid nature of the system, that may arise if such guarantees are not provided. The work of [30] and [31] explicitly address the issue of safety in terms of the continuous dynamics, assuming the deceleration capability of all vehicles is uniform and without taking into account the discrete disturbances generated by possible vehicle collisions. Similar calculations for different deceleration capabilities can be found in [28] and [32] . The work presented here extends preliminary results reported in [33] .
In Section II, we give a brief overview of the modeling formalism introduced in [34] and use it to model the vehicles. In Section III our design methodology is applied to the case of autonomous vehicles. We derive conditions for safety and upper bounds on the throughput that can be expected. In Section IV we show how the throughput can be increased by introducing partial centralization and discuss the concept of platooning. Sufficient conditions that guarantee the safety of an AHS that supports platooning are given in Section V. In the concluding Section VI we discuss some of the key points of our design methodology and some directions for future work. To maintain the flow of the paper some of the more technical proofs are given in Appendix B.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Modeling Formalism and Dynamic Games
We briefly present the hybrid system modeling formalism that will be used to describe various components of the system. For more details the reader is referred to [34] . represents the tangent space of . We use to denote the input variables, to denote the output variables, and to denote the state variables. We assume that discrete sets are given the discrete topology while continuous sets are given the Euclidean topology. Without loss of generality we assume that is time invariant. A hybrid system describes the evolution of the variables over time. We assume a set of times of interest of the form . The variables will evolve either continuously or in instantaneous jumps. Therefore, the evolution of the system will be over sets of the form with for all and for all . The implication is that are the times where discrete jumps occur. We will use to denote the set of all such "super-dense" time trajectories and to denote an element of . . It should be noted that existence and/or uniqueness of runs cannot be guaranteed. In fact, one can very easily construct hybrid automata that for some initial conditions and/or inputs accept multiple runs or no runs at all. These issues are of theoretical interest but need not concern us in this paper; the automata used to model the vehicles will accept unique runs.
Let be a collection of hybrid automata . We can write the inputs and outputs in vector form as and . Let Definition 3: An interconnection of a collection of automata is a partial map . The interpretation is that an interconnection constrains some input variables to have the same value as some output variables. It can be shown that under some mild consistency assumptions an interconnection of hybrid automata defines a new hybrid automaton whose state space is the product of the state spaces of the original automata, its output space is the product of the output spaces, and its input space is the product of the input spaces minus the pre-image of .
To simplify the subsequent discussion we introduce a special kind of boolean variable, called an event. The event is said to occur whenever its value changes from "True" to "False" or vice versa. In the computer science literature events are typically associated with discrete transitions in the state of an automaton. Here events are treated as discrete input and output variables as in [35] and play the role of the input and output "actions" of [6] . It is easy to show that for a given hybrid automaton , one can construct a new automaton whose evolution is identical to that of with the exception that an event occurs upon particular transitions. This can be done by adding a boolean state and a boolean output variable for each event. Similarly, by adding boolean input and a boolean state variable an automaton can be forced to take an enabled transition upon the occurrence of an event. Note that the addition of each event doubles the cardinality of . If is finite, the hybrid automaton is typically presented as a directed graph [1] , [2] whose nodes are indexed by the elements of . While the discrete state is "in a node" , the continuous state evolves along a vector field, with . To each node we associate an invariant ; the interpretation is that the system can remain in node if and only if . The discrete evolution is captured by transitions between the nodes. To the transition from node to node we associate a guard ; the interpretation is that the transition can take place if and only if . To each transition we also associate a set valued map ; the interpretation is that if the transition takes place from , then after the transition the state can find itself in any with . A typical edge of the graph is shown in Fig. 1 . By convention, the guard appears first and the reset relation (denoted by or ) appears second. To simplify the figures we list an input event Event that triggers a transition (if any) together with the transition guard and an output event Event triggered by a transition together with the transition reset map. Figures like these will be used subsequently as formal definitions of hybrid automata. On some occasions we will use similar figures informally to convey an idea rather than define a system. In this case we will use circles instead of squares to distinguish the informal automata from the formal ones.
Motivated by [36] we consider the following type of twoplayer zero sum games.
Definition 4: A two-player zero sum dynamic game consists of a time interval , a trajectory space , an input space , a disturbance space , an output space , a hybrid automaton , and a cost function . Player 1 is said to control the input while player 2 is said to control the disturbance . A collection of is an admissible play if there exists for which is a run of .
We will assume that the reward of player 1 for a given play is , while the reward of player 2 is ; player 1 is trying to minimize while player 2 is trying to maximize it. We will also assume a closed-loop perfect state information structure; when called upon to decide their strategy at time , both players have access to the entire state trajectory up to that point. For simplicity we therefore set . If the hybrid automaton admits a unique run for every initial condition, input, and disturbance trajectory, one can write the cost function as simply For this class of games we will be interested in the following type of solutions.
Definition 5: A global saddle solution to the two-player zero sum game is a pair of input and disturbance trajectories such that for all , all , and all A saddle solution is such that any unilateral deviation from it leaves the player who decided to deviate in worse condition. The games considered in this paper turn out to have unique saddle solutions. Existence and uniqueness of solutions cannot be guaranteed in general, however.
B. Vehicle Model
Consider a number of vehicles moving on an AHS (Fig. 2) . 1 We try to capture the evolution of the pair and use and to isolate them from the rest of the lane. Vehicles in adjacent lanes will only come into play during lane changes. The model we develop is hybrid: the continuous dynamics reflect the movement of the vehicles, while the discrete dynamics reflect possible collisions between them. In our safety calculations we impose the following restrictions.
Assumption 1: The operation of all vehicles is normal, all vehicle parameters are known, and lateral control is perfect. Each vehicle is equipped with sensors that provide noiseless continuous measurements of its velocity and acceleration as well as distance and relative velocity with respect to vehicles in front, both in the same and in adjacent lanes. Sensing and actuation delays are negligible.
The assumption of normal operation is crucial in proving safety. If faults or adverse environmental conditions are allowed, the design of safe controllers becomes substantially more complicated [37] . Knowledge of the vehicle parameters (aerodynamic coefficients, mass, etc.) is needed for feedback linearization of the vehicles dynamics (see [38] ). This assumption can be relaxed by an adaptive [38] , robust, or sliding mode controller [39] . Under normal conditions near-perfect lateral control has been shown to be possible both for lane keeping and for lane changing in [40] and [41] . We further assume that perfect lateral operation can be maintained even in the presence of collisions. Finally, the assumed sensor arrangement is realistic for current technology. The calculations presented here easily generalize to vehicle models with sensing and actuation delays, lags, and small additive noise [42] . We assume that the sensor ranges are large enough to maintain safety.
The automaton describing the evolution of the pair has three discrete states and four continuous states. In vehicle is moving without touching vehicle , in vehicles and are moving while pushing against one another, and in vehicle has stopped. Let denote the length of vehicle and its position from a fixed roadside reference. The dynamics and the safety requirements do not depend on the absolute position of the vehicles. Therefore, to reduce the size of the continuous state space we introduce a variable to keep track of the spacing between vehicles and . Following [27] , we assume that (after feedback linearization) the controller of vehicle can directly set the jerk through brakes and accelerator actuators. By Assumption 1 vehicle is equipped with sensors to measure its own velocity and acceleration and the spacing and relative velocity with respect to vehicle . The acceleration of vehicle is assumed to be unknown to vehicle and is treated as a disturbance. The continuous dynamics in states and can now be described by a state vector with (1) In state , the continuous dynamics can be more complicated. While vehicles and are touching, the acceleration of vehicle depends not only on the jerk commanded by its controller, but also on the contact forces exerted by vehicle . State is not safety critical however, as it is impossible for vehicles and to collide while they are touching each other. We will therefore not model the continuous dynamics in state in detail, we will just assume that they are of the form for some function which is Lipschitz continuous in and continuous in and . To simplify the notation, we drop the subscripts whenever it is clear we are referring to the pair and use and to denote the continuous state of the pair and to denote the input of vehicle . Physical considerations impose constraints on the continuous state and inputs To ensure our model is realistic, we impose some minimal assumptions on the constraints.
Assumption 2: and . The transitions of the discrete state are governed by the obvious invariants, guards, and reset relations. Additional discrete dynamics arise because of possible collisions between the vehicles. For simplicity we assume the following.
Assumption 3: All collisions are elastic and all vehicles have equal masses.
The case of partially inelastic collisions and unequal masses can be included by introducing some additional notation and minor changes in the subsequent calculations. Three kinds of collisions affect the pair . Collisions between vehicles and take place whenever and will be used to determine the safety of the system. Upon their occurrence an output event is issued, is reset to , and is reset to . Collisions between vehicles and , and between vehicles and , are treated as disturbances by vehicle . They are modeled by an input event (respectively, ) and a continuous input (respectively, ). Upon their occurrence, is reset to (respectively, is reset to and is reset to ). Clearly the value of is of interest only at the times when occur. We use to denote the overall disturbance trajectory for vehicle . The subscript of will again be omitted when the context is clear. Without loss of generality we assume that a trajectory starts at time from an initial condition . Proposition 1: For every and every and piecewise continuous the plant automaton accepts a unique trajectory.
Note that piecewise continuous is equivalent to piecewise constant under the discrete topology.
A standard requirement for automated vehicles is that they will not be allowed to drive in reverse. This requirement can easily be added to our model. We use to denote the class of controllers that apply whenever . All controllers designed in this paper will belong to the class . Under the conditions of Lemma 1 the dynamics of the pair are summarized in Fig. 3 . The invariants, guards, and reset relations omitted in the figure are given in Appendix A. Our analysis is primarily concerned with safety, therefore (unless otherwise stated) we will assume in subsequent analysis, as the vehicles cannot collide otherwise.
Lemma 1 suggests that is a conservative estimate of the disturbances that vehicle may face. Therefore, if controllers are shown to be safe with respect to , they are guaranteed to be safe for the real system. Further restrictions can be imposed on through interconnections of the plant automaton with the outputs of appropriate automata that model the behavior of the controllers of vehicles and . In our design we will make use of a restriction that allows a single and a single event and limits the relative velocity of the corresponding collisions to and , respectively. In this case the overall disturbance can be compactly parameterized by , where is the time occurs. The class of allowable disturbances has the form piecewise continuous
(2)
C. Design Specifications
Ideally, we want no collisions to occur on the AHS. Our analysis will indicate that this requirement may be too restrictive in terms of throughput. Previous studies [43] suggest that collisions with small relative velocities are not likely to result in serious damage to the vehicles or injury to the passengers. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 6: A safe collision between two vehicles is one where the relative velocity at impact is less than a threshold . An Automated Highway System where vehicles experience only safe collisions is called a safe AHS.
Based on the analysis of [43] , we set ms in our calculations.
For each vehicle we treat the controller design as a twoplayer zero sum game between the vehicle controller and the disturbance . The game is over a number of cost functions that reflect the various requirements imposed on the controller. The top priority requirement is, of course, safety. Whenever possible, we would like the vehicles not to collide at all. This requirement can be encoded by a cost function (3) A controller is safe with respect to if it can guarantee that m. The limiting case of "no collision" corresponds to two vehicles touching each other with zero relative velocity.
In our calculations we will also have to deal with situations where a collision is unavoidable. In this case, the goal of the controller is to minimize the relative velocity at impact. This alternative safety requirement can be encoded by (4) where . A controller will be safe with respect to if it can guarantee that ms . Whenever safety is not an issue, the controller is required to provide a comfortable ride for the passengers. We assume that comfort implies small control inputs. 2 We encode comfort using the cost function (5) A maneuver will be comfortable if ms . If neither safety nor comfort are at stake, we would like the controller to converge to a steady-state spacing from the vehicle in front and a desired velocity . These performance requirements can be encoded by an efficiency cost function (6) where reflects the desired spacing and velocity and is a positive semidefinite matrix.
The design methodology of [15] allows us to deal with all the cost functions discussed above by solving a sequence of nested games. In this paper, we are primarily concerned with the issue of safety and will therefore discuss the issues of passenger comfort and efficiency only briefly.
III. AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
We first derive safety conditions for the simplest possible automated highway system, a decentralized design where no collisions take place. We refer to this design as an autonomous vehicle AHS. We start with a single lane highway and concentrate on an arbitrary vehicle . Our goal is to avoid collisions altogether, therefore we treat the safety problem as a game between the control (action of vehicle ) and the disturbance (actions of vehicles and ) over cost function . The safety calculation proceeds by assuming no collisions are possible, designing safe controllers under this assumption, and then verifying that if the resulting controller is used, the "no collision" assumption is indeed satisfied.
A. Autonomous Vehicle Safety
Consider an arbitrary vehicle . If no collisions take place, the only disturbance to vehicle comes from , i.e., . Formally this is equivalent to an interconnection of the and input events with the outputs of an automaton that never generates and . Proof: From Lemma 2 and an induction argument on the number of vehicles it follows that no collisions are obtained on such an AHS. Therefore, the AHS is safe.
The analysis generalizes to a multilane highway by adding simple lane change protocols and control laws. Section V-A3 describes how can be used to derive conditions under which a lane change can be executed in safety for a more complicated AHS design that involves platooning. The results trivially generalize to the autonomous vehicle case.
B. Passenger Comfort and Efficiency
Having established conditions for safety, we now turn our attention to passenger comfort and efficiency. Formally, the comfort requirement can be treated as a game between and over cost function . We seek a saddle solution
The requirement that implies that such a saddle solution is safe but can only exist if . The saddle solution itself is not very important in this case, all we need is the set of safe and comfortable controls, given by if if if if (10) To complete the design, the requirement for efficiency should also be addressed. We will not go into the details of the efficient design. This problem can be approached in a number of ways and the solution does not affect safety in any way. One possible design could make use of the saddle solution , for cost function with ; other designs like the ones in [27] and [28] may be even more appropriate. To make sure the design is reasonable, we will only assume that the desired steady-state spacing satisfies and that the desired velocity is never exceeded. These objectives can be achieved by a controller that switches between tracking spacing and tracking , based on state information [27] . The resulting safe, comfortable, and efficient controller can be implemented by a hybrid automaton (Fig. 4) . The controller automaton has no continuous state. Its input and its output are provided from/to the plant automaton through the obvious interconnection.
C. Autonomous Vehicle Throughput
Calculating the expected throughput for a proposed AHS design is a very challenging task. Our analysis can be used to obtain an upper bound on the steady-state throughput. Lemma 2 provides the minimum spacing required for safety if a steady-state velocity is maintained. This quantity gives rise to what is known in the transportation literature as the pipeline throughput, the steady state per lane capacity of the highway in the absence of lateral flow (lane changes, entry, and exit). Assuming all vehicles have the same length , the pipeline throughput (in vehicles per lane per unit time) is given by (11) This is clearly a very optimistic estimate. Even if the demand is high enough, the actual value of the throughput is likely to be much smaller because of safety margins (added to to account for delays, sensor noise, etc.) and lateral flow disturbances. Pipeline throughput can nonetheless provide useful information. Assume that the vehicles have no knowledge of their deceleration capability but know that it is bounded in an interval . Then, to maintain safety, they need to follow each other at a spacing (recall that is parameterized by the model constants ). The resulting throughput for ms , ms , , and m is shown in Fig. 8 (case ). With minimal changes the estimate can be refined to allow for sensing and actuation delays, safety margins, and different information structures (e.g., vehicles estimating on line) [42] . The results of our calculations can also directly be used in more elaborate throughput estimates that take into account lateral flow (see [44] ).
IV. PLATOONS OF VEHICLES
A. The Platooning Concept
Can we somehow exceed the maximum throughput of the autonomous AHS? The calculations of Section III indicate that this cannot be done unless either the vehicles are allowed to collide or some centralization is introduced (more global information is made available to them). We now try to derive conditions for a safe AHS on which collisions are possible; it will soon become apparent that some degree of centralization is needed in this case to guarantee that all collisions are safe.
Consider again the pair and assume that initially . A crucial observation [45] (which can also be inferred from the calculations in this paper) is that in the presence of differences in deceleration capability and/or sensing and actuation delays, collisions will be at low relative velocities if either the vehicles are far enough from one another (in which case they can come to a stop before colliding) or they are close enough (in which case a collision happens almost instantaneously and therefore the relative velocity is low). This observation gives rise to the platooning concept, where it is envisioned that vehicles will travel in platoons, following each other very closely with spacings of the order of 2-4 m. Platoons are separated by large spacings to avoid interplatoon collisions. In addition to safety, the large interplatoon spacing helps attenuate disturbances as they propagate down a string of platoons.
In [46] a control hierarchy was proposed to organize traffic in platoons. The hierarchy involves controllers both on the vehicles and on the roadside. The goal of the roadside controllers is to maximize the flow of the highway system by appropriately routing traffic. A number of designs have been proposed for the roadside controller, making use of traffic flow models [47] , [48] , the concept of highway work [49] , and the concept of highway space-time [50] .
The hierarchy of [46] calls for an on-board vehicle controller organized in two layers: the coordination layer and the regulation layer. It is envisioned that the regulation layer will consist of primarily continuous controllers for maintaining safe spacing between the vehicles, tracking desired velocities, etc. The coordination layer on the other hand will be primarily discrete and will be responsible for the intervehicle communication necessary to ensure safety. Our goal in the remainder of this paper is to produce regulation layer controllers and specifications for the coordination layer so that the hybrid onboard controller is guaranteed to be safe. We then use our results to obtain an upper bound on the throughput that can be achieved in safety on a platoon-based AHS.
B. Discrete Aspects
To motivate the design process we first describe informally the operation of a vehicle on an AHS that supports platooning. The vehicle can find itself in one of two discrete modes: the leader mode and the follower mode. 3 The state of the vehicle is also indexed by its discrete lane. Assume that the automated lanes are assigned numbers, increasing from right to left, with one representing the right-most lane, and let lane number zero indicate that the vehicle is off the AHS. The discrete state of an automated vehicle can be summarized by a pair (mode, lane) with mode leader, follower and lane This is a somewhat coarse description of the discrete state (for example we do not keep track of the exact position of a vehicle in the platoon), but it will suffice for our purposes.
The evolution of the discrete state of an automated vehicle can be represented informally by the automaton of Fig. 5 . The figure suggests the tasks that the regulation layer controller will be called upon to perform: tracking the desired spacing for the two modes and executing the transitions. The transitions between the discrete states are achieved by means of five maneuvers: join, split, lane change, entry, and exit. The join maneuver is used to join two platoons in a single lane to form a bigger platoon. The trailing platoon accelerates to catch up with the leading platoon. The split maneuver is used to break a platoon into two smaller platoons. The trailing platoon decelerates to safe interplatoon distance. The lane change maneuver is used to move a vehicle from one lane to another. Finally, the entry and exit maneuvers allow the vehicle to get on/off the automated highway.
In [51] communication protocols were designed to implement the discrete aspects of these maneuvers. The protocols are in the form of finite state machines, a special class of hybrid automata with no continuous state. Some simplifying assumptions were made; for example, it was assumed that a platoon can only be engaged in one maneuver at a time and that only single vehicles ( free agents) can change lanes. The performance of the proposed protocols was verified using COSPAN [52] , a finite-state machine model checker. The verification concerned only discrete aspects of the protocol operation, such as absence of deadlocks. Here we establish conditions on the protocol transitions that allow us to extend the verification to continuous aspects of the system operation, in particular safety with respect to collisions.
C. The Follower Mode
Some of the issues that arise in the regulation layer design are not addressed here. Besides the limitations of scope introduced in Assumption 1, we will not address the design of control laws for the follower mode. This problem is particularly challenging and has received considerable attention in recent years [25] , [38] . The most obvious difficulty is regulating to the constant follower spacing at all speeds, without running into the preceding vehicle. In [25] it was shown that to achieve this objective a vehicle needs information about the acceleration of the preceding vehicle, in addition to the spacing and relative velocity information available through the sensors. It is envisioned that this information will be communicated among adjacent vehicles in a platoon using a point-to-point infrared link. Another problem is that small disturbances (e.g., a transient change in the velocity of the platoon leader) may get amplified as they propagate from one follower to the next, possibly resulting in collisions down the string. In [25] it was shown that to avoid this slinky effect, followers also need information about the state of the platoon leader in addition to information about the vehicle immediately ahead of them. Because the delays of point-to-point communication increase with the size of the platoon, this information has to be broadcast by the leader (using a radio link for example). Finally, in [25] it was shown that the follower control law will result in amplification of the control effort exerted by followers further back in the platoon. This imposes restrictions on the operation of the leader. If, for example, the braking force is amplified by a factor of , then, in a platoon of identical vehicles with deceleration capability , the deceleration of the lead vehicle should not exceed in order to avoid actuator saturation and the possibility of collisions within the platoon.
Here we circumvent these complications by assuming that a follower control law , a safe set of initial conditions in the follower state space , and a time (possibly dependent on the size of the platoon) have been determined, such that we have the following assumption.
Assumption 4 (Platoon String Stability Under Collisions): Assume that all followers apply
, that at time the state of all but one of the followers is in , and that a safe collision occurs between the exceptional follower and the vehicle ahead of it. For any , if no interplatoon collisions occur in the interval , then at time the state of all followers is in , no intraplatoon collisions occur in , while in all intraplatoon collisions are safe and the first and last vehicles experience at most one collision.
The assumption is intended to capture the situation of Fig. 6 . Two platoons moving at slightly different speeds collide and become one platoon. If the intraplatoon spacing is small and Assumption 3 is satisfied, after a finite number of intraplatoon collisions the vehicle velocities will still be close to the initial velocities, but arranged in decreasing order. The work of [25] and [53] and intuition from basic collision dynamics suggest that this is not an unrealistic assumption. We are currently working on casting the follower control problem in the design framework discussed here and proving Assumption 4 as a theorem.
V. PLATOONING IN SAFETY
A. Regulation Layer Design
To implement an AHS that supports platooning, continuous control laws are needed for the leader and follower modes and for the join, split, lane change, entry, and exit maneuvers. The design of the follower law was discussed in Section IV-C. Here we describe the design of the remaining controllers. We restrict our attention to safety; passenger comfort and efficiency are assumed to be treated as in Section III-B. The controllers for the lead mode and the various maneuvers differ from one another in the cost function used to encode safety and in the disturbances that they have to guard against. The reason for these differences will become apparent in the next section, when the coordination protocols are discussed. The controllers for the leader mode and the lane change, entry, and exit maneuvers will be required to prevent collisions altogether; therefore, the cost function used in their design will be . The join and split controllers on the other hand will allow safe collisions; therefore, the cost function used in their design will be . The disturbances experienced by each controller will differ in the severity of and . The coordination protocols will be such that a vehicle in the leader mode may face (one safe collision between and and one safe collision between and ), a vehicle executing a join or a split may face (no collision by either or ), while during a lane change, entry, or exit vehicles may face either or .
1) Leader Law:
We treat the design of the controller for the lead mode as a game between and over cost function . Consider the candidate saddle solution where and are given by (7) , then vehicles and will not collide.
Proof: The proof follows by Proposition 3 and the properties of the saddle solution.
Lemma 3 requires that , therefore at most one and at most one events are allowed. This requirement is imposed because these events can push the state outside . If more events of the same kind occur while , a collision may be possible. The requirement can be relaxed to allow more and/or events once returns to .
Lemma 4:
There exists a finite such that if for some , no or events occur in and for all , then either or . Lemma 3 provides safety guarantees for the leader mode, while Lemma 4 provides "liveness" guarantees. If the disturbance is such that any two or events are separated by , then a vehicle under will not collide with the vehicle ahead of it, and it will either stop or its state will return to infinitely often.
2) Join and Split Laws:
We treat the design of the controllers for the join and split maneuvers as a game between and over cost function . Proposition 5 (Join/Split Saddle Solution): At any time the saddle inputs and take on either the minimum or the maximum value allowed by the constraints. Each trajectory may involve at most one switching from the maximum to the minimum and at the time of impact both and are at their minimum values. can take on its maximum value only when does. The proof of Proposition 5 (Appendix B) suggests that if vehicle can decelerate harder than vehicle and a collision takes place before vehicle stops, then the worst disturbance vehicle can generate may involve hard acceleration (in an attempt to increase the distance to vehicle ) followed by hard braking. In extreme cases the best response for vehicle may also involve hard acceleration (in an attempt to keep up with vehicle ) followed by hard braking. These predictions were verified in [54] by numerical experiments.
Unlike the leader and autonomous cases, the calculation of the safe sets and controls has to be done numerically in this case, as it is difficult to express the saddle solution in feedback form and solve the corresponding equations. 4 From the point of view of safety, the join and split controllers can be treated very similarly. Clearly the rest of the controller design will have to be different, as the objectives of the two maneuvers differ. The design can be completed using the techniques outlined in Section III or by using other controllers proposed for this purpose in the literature [27] , [28] . As before, define (14) if if if (15) Let the controllers for the join and split maneuvers, and , be feedback controllers satisfying and .
Lemma 5 (Join/Split Safety): If
and for all , then and vehicles and will either not collide or will experience a safe collision.
Proof: By the properties of the saddle solution and the definitions of safe states and controls.
3) Lane Change, Entry, and Exit Laws: We assume the lane change policy of [51] , where a vehicle is a free agent both before and after the lane change. Assume free agent wishes to move to the lane where platoons and are moving. The lane change can be decomposed in two phases. In the first phase and/or decelerate so that is aligned with an appropriate gap in the target lane. In the second phase the actual move of from the origin to the target lane takes place. For the purpose of safety, entry and exit from the automated highway will be treated as a simplified version of a lane change. In particular, entry will be modeled as a lane change from the on-ramp to an automated lane, with vehicles and missing. Exit will be modeled as a lane change from an automated lane to an off ramp, with vehicles and missing. Specialized controllers are needed for vehicles and ( and , respectively) for the lane change maneuver.
During the alignment phase makes use of and to keep safe with respect to while bringing it sufficiently far away from for the lane change to take place. During the move phase ensures that remains safe with respect to both and . Likewise, during the alignment phase makes use of and to keep safe from while creating a gap for . During the move phase, ensures that remains safe with respect to both and . The coordination protocols will guarantee that while a vehicle is applying it will not be hit from behind (no disturbance) and that while it is applying it will not be hit from behind, and the lane changing vehicle will not experience a collision (no or disturbance). The protocols will also require that a vehicle should not collide with the vehicle ahead of it while applying or . We therefore treat the design of as a game between and and the design of as a game between and , both over cost function . By the proof of Proposition 3, it is immediately apparent that the saddle solution in the first case is the same as with , and in the second case it is the same as with . Let and denote these saddle solutions and define the second sentence provides conditions under which the move phase is safe. During the alignment phase need not worry about colliding with , and need not worry about colliding with . Therefore, and can apply a milder control input instead of when and when , respectively. During the move phase, however, is needed in both these cases to guarantee safety. The protocol design will be such that during the lane change vehicle will be applying . Therefore, throughout the move phase is safe with respect to both and (by Lemma 6) , is safe with respect to both the and (by Lemma 6), and is safe with respect to both and (by Lemma 3 and Proposition 4). Hence, the lane change can be safely aborted at any stage. This is a very desirable property as it allows us to decouple the lanes. Proposition 4 also implies that occlusion of vehicles during a lane change does not affect safety. For example, vehicle can remain safe with respect to vehicle even though it has sensory information about it only after vehicle has effectively left the lane. Note that once enters , it remains there throughout the lane change. However, and can leave the set due to collisions of vehicles or . A "liveness" guarantee, similar to Lemma 4, can be also be given for the lane change. 
B. Coordination Layer Specifications
We describe a set of requirements imposed on the coordination layer so that its interaction with the regulation layer control laws is guaranteed to be safe. The discussion in this section is informal and provides only the information necessary for stating and proving the platooning safety theorem. The discrete steps we assume are consistent with the protocols specified in [51] , while the discrete/continuous interface aspects are consistent with the design of [55] . The formal analysis carried out in these two papers provides performance guarantees for the discrete dynamics of the system.
All followers are assumed to apply and, unless otherwise stated, the leaders are assumed to apply . Assumption 4 allows us to ignore the follower dynamics for the most part. By abuse of notation, let and (Fig. 2) represent platoons of and vehicles, respectively, and let denote the distance between the leader of and the last follower of . Following [51] we assume all communication and coordination is handled by the platoon leader.
First consider what happens when joins . The maneuver is initiated by , whose leader checks that the platoon is not already engaged in another maneuver and that . If this is the case, the leader declares the platoon engaged in a join maneuver and sends a join request to the leader of . Upon receiving the maneuver request, the leader of platoon checks if it is already engaged in another maneuver. If this is the case, the request is declined. A message is sent to the leader of who aborts the join (is no longer engaged in the maneuver and remains a leader). Otherwise, the leader of switches to the set , corresponding to the deceleration capability it would have if and were to join successfully (recall that the deceleration of a leader is limited by the deceleration capabilities of all the followers). Even if initially for the new , the design of is such that after a finite amount of time , either stops or . In the former case the join request is declined, while in the latter the maneuver is accepted by . An appropriate message is sent to which accordingly either aborts the maneuver or checks if still . If this is the case, the leader of applies until either or the leader of collides with the last vehicle of . In either case, intraplatoon coordination is established, the leader of starts applying , and and begin operating as a single vehicle platoon. If there was no collision the new platoon declares the maneuver complete and is no longer engaged in it. Otherwise, the new platoon waits until for all followers (guaranteed to be the case by at most time units) and then a further in time units before declaring the maneuver complete. The extra time is added to allow to return to , which it may have left as a result of the collision. Note that there is no guarantee that the join will successfully terminate in a finite amount of time (though this is likely to be the case in most realistic situations). Now assume represents the last vehicles and the first vehicles of a platoon of size , and consider what happens if wants to split from . The leader checks that the platoon is not already engaged in another maneuver, that , and that . If this is the case it declares the platoon as engaged in a split maneuver and the "leader" of applies . If collides with , the maneuver is aborted following the same process as a join termination. If at some point or if stops the maneuver is completed, the leader of starts applying and the leader of switches to the set corresponding to the new platoon size. Both and declare themselves as no longer engaged in the split maneuver.
Finally 
C. Platooning Safety
Theorem 2 (Platoon Safety): An AHS populated by a finite number of vehicles following the proposed coordination and regulation requirements will be safe.
Proof: The proof involves the lemmas of Section V-A, the coordination requirements of Section V-B, and an induction argument on the number of vehicles. Consider again the vehicles of Fig. 2 . 5 First consider joining or splitting from . In this case the coordination requirements ensure that and belong to . Therefore, Assumption 4 and Lemmas 3 and 6 ensure that vehicle will not experience any collision disturbances. According to Lemma 5, platoon may experience a safe collision with platoon . After the collision, all vehicles in platoon start applying . By Assumption 4, all followers return to after a finite number of safe collisions and the first vehicle of platoon and the last vehicle of platoon experiencing at most one collision. Now consider applying the leader control law. A join/split maneuver between vehicles and may produce one collision disturbance for vehicle . The coordination specification of Section V-B also permits to join/split from . This maneuver can also potentially result in safe collisions. Still, Lemma 3 guarantees that vehicle will not collide with vehicle . When and/or occur, the state of vehicle may leave the set . According to Lemma 4,  will be the maximum time it takes for the state 5 By Assumption 5 A; 1 1 1 ; H may in fact represent entire platoons.
to return to in this case, i.e., a lower bound on the time separation between two successive collisions of the same kind that can be tolerated by . The coordination requirement on the join and split maneuvers guarantees that if the maneuver results in collision, a new join or split will not be initiated before all intraplatoon collisions subside and an extra interval elapses. This timing requirement on join/split guarantees that the assumptions of Lemma 3 are satisfied, implying that vehicle will not collide with vehicle under . A similar argument indicates that a vehicle executing a lane change maneuver (and consequently an entry or an exit) will not collide with the vehicle ahead of it.
Note that the limitation of "one maneuver per vehicle at a time" imposed by the coordination layer [51] ensures that the front vehicle of a joining or splitting pair will be in the leader mode, while the trailing vehicle will either be followed by a vehicle in the leader mode or by one executing a lane change. The additional timing constraint ensures that the platoons have enough time to recover from the collisions before a new join or split is initiated. Overall, collisions due to joining and splitting are guaranteed not to propagate beyond the platoons engaged in the maneuver.
Corollary 1 (Individual Maneuver Safety): Any collisions that take place during the join or split maneuvers or in the follower mode will be safe. A vehicle will never collide while executing a lane change (and hence an entry or an exit). A vehicle in the leader mode will never collide with the vehicle ahead of it. 
D. Platooning Throughput
In addition to the lane change, entry, and exit disturbances, the calculation of the throughput for an AHS that supports platoons is further complicated by the presence of disturbances due to the formation and dissipation of platoons. Pipeline throughput estimates can again provide an upper bound. Assume an AHS is populated entirely by platoons of size moving at velocity at steady state. Let denote the follower spacing. It is easy to see that the throughput of such an AHS in vehicles per lane per unit time is given by (16) As for the autonomous vehicle case, assume that vehicles do not know their deceleration capability but know that it is bounded in a range . Following [25] , we can model the fact that the deceleration of the leader is limited by that of the followers by assuming that platoons follow each other at spacings of where for and respectively. The resulting throughput for is shown in Fig. 8 . Note that as platoon leaders have to be able to tolerate , whereas autonomous vehicles only have to deal with , the platooning throughput can be smaller at low speeds.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We presented a methodology for the design of hybrid onboard controllers for automated vehicles. The methodology was based on techniques from game theory and optimal control. Assuming a particular policy for intervehicle information exchange, these techniques allow us to quantify the safe behaviors of the system. Moreover, the calculations suggest ways in which the intervehicle information exchange can be modified to improve the system performance. The safety conditions obtained by solving the gaming problems are clearly sufficient. They are also necessary in the sense of being "tight." The properties of the saddle solution imply that if the safety conditions are violated (e.g., an autonomous vehicle finds itself closer than from the preceding vehicle), there exist disturbance trajectories (e.g., acceleration trajectories of the preceding vehicle) that will result in a collision. We demonstrated our approach by designing safe controllers for an AHS based on autonomous vehicles and an AHS that allows intervehicle cooperation and supports platooning.
One advantage of the proposed methodology is that it provides considerable insight into the system that can be useful in contexts other than controller design. We showed how limits on pipeline throughput can directly be inferred from our calculations. The calculations can also be used to infer technological requirements such as sensor ranges. A vehicle needs to be safe even if a stopped vehicle appears at the limit of its sensor range; therefore, the minimum sensor range needed for safe steady-state operation with speed is . Our results also indicate what pieces of information would improve performance. For example, it is easy to see that knowledge of the vehicles deceleration capability can greatly reduce the average following distance and hence increase throughput [42] .
In our framework, the role of interagent coordination is to reduce the set of allowable disturbances. This has the effect of "biasing" the game in favor of the controller and hence increasing the range of conditions under which game winning controls exist and improving the overall system performance. The intervehicle coordination was used to limit both the discrete (collisions) and continuous (acceleration) disturbances to produce safe join and split controllers.
Our calculations deal with only a class of safety problems of importance for AHS. There are still a number of questions to be answered. For example, the safety of the follower operation was taken for granted here, even in the presence of collisions. More work is needed to show Assumption 4 can indeed be satisfied and to relax it if possible. An even more challenging problem is relaxing the "normal operation" assumption to allow faults and adverse environmental conditions. This may require not only extending the architecture with fault detection capabilities [37] and new controllers [56] but also changing the methodology of the verification. Here, our objective was to show that no unsafe collisions are possible. In the presence of faults it is easy to construct scenarios where unsafe collisions are possible whatever the controller does [56] . A possible solution would be to introduce probabilistic analysis and require that the probability of unsafe collisions is small. Formulating such proofs will require considerable extension of our design methodology.
Probabilistic analysis can also be used to produce less conservative "normal mode" controllers. The design methodology presented in this paper assumes that the worst disturbance may be produced by neighboring vehicles at any time, thereby leading to somewhat conservative designs with smaller throughput. If we use parameters corresponding to manual driving in our models, the resulting controllers would yield less throughput than the one observed on existing highways. The fairly small number of collisions on the current highway system indicates that the probability of the worst disturbance arising must be small. A probabilistic analysis methodology that takes into account the process of disturbance generation can be used to further analyze the safety/capacity tradeoff in an AHS. Probabilistic safety analysis also has the potential to provide control designs for partially automated vehicles operating in mixed automated-manual traffic, which is perhaps the most challenging problem in this area.
APPENDIX A DISCRETE DYNAMICS OF THE PLANT AUTOMATON
See Table I .
APPENDIX B ADDITIONAL PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1: Existence and uniqueness during continuous evolution is guaranteed by the linear dynamics in states and and the assumptions on . Existence for the discrete evolution is guaranteed, as for each value of the disjunction of the invariant and the guards of the outgoing transitions is true. Uniqueness for the discrete evolution is guaranteed, as for each value of the pairwise conjunction of the guards of the outgoing transitions among themselves and with the invariant is false.
Proof of Lemma 1: By assumption, no vehicles are moving backward in the beginning of the run. We show that this property is preserved by showing that if it holds in a given state it also holds for all states that can be reached from there either by discrete transitions or by continuous evolution; the claim follows by induction on the length of the run of the automaton.
Assume that no vehicles are moving backward in a given state. Consider first the states that can be reached from that state by discrete transitions. Transition increases , while transitions and leave it unaffected. Therefore, if is true before any of these transitions, it will also be true afterwards. as an integral cost function, assume that optimal controls exist, and proceed to classify them using the Maximum Principle [57] . At the time of impact , the relative velocity will be negative, therefore 
